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It seems that wherever one looks in the Western world today, the notion of 
sovereignty, a principle that has characterized political life in the West for 
over two millennia, is under attack. The notion that political actors— be 
they states or citizens—possess an exclusive and legitimate monopoly on the 
exercise of power over their property and their “persons,” a notion crucial 
to the development of both international law and human rights, is increas-
ingly viewed as chauvinistic, xenophobic, or the product of entrenched elite 
interests. One sees the effects of this attack on state sovereignty most clearly 
in the refugee crisis afflicting the European Union. Under the weight of a 
half century of non-European immigration, the Schengen Agreements, and 
the reigning orthodoxy of Europe’s intellectual and political elites, Euro-
pean states find themselves increasingly unable to determine who can and 
cannot legitimately lay claim to the benefits conferred by residence in their 
countries.  As for the sovereignty of citizens, contemporary arguments over 
microaggressions, trigger warnings, “safe spaces” and “privilege” all circum-
scribe ever more narrowly the freedom of the individual to say, do, and think 
as he or she chooses under the law, arguments whose all too predictable 
consequences are now playing out on the campuses of America’s colleges 
and universities. It is thus a somber paradox that the American academy, 
an institution so deeply indebted to a robust conception of both national 
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and individual freedom, should be celebrating those efforts to declare sover-
eignty dead once and for all.  
Two new books add their voices to the chorus of those cheering the 
demise of sovereignty: On Sovereignty and Other Political Delusions by Joan 
Cocks and Freedom Beyond Sovereignty: Reconstructing Liberal Individualism 
by Sharon Krause. Cocks’s brief work criticizes the exclusionary sovereignty 
of states through her treatment of the violence inherent in all acts of political 
founding, which she illustrates using two particular cases: the American gov-
ernment’s mistreatment of Native Americans and the Palestinian diaspora 
created by the founding of the state of Israel. Krause, on the other hand, pro-
vides a sustained theoretical reflection on the conditions that characterize, 
enable, and limit individual agency and advances a new theory of freedom 
as nonoppression, one meant to make good on the promise of “freedom and 
justice for all.” 
Both Cocks and Krause argue against current and traditional concep-
tions of sovereignty on the grounds of our political, ecological, social, and 
spiritual interdependence. For Cocks, the critique of state sovereignty, a 
critique which is actually aimed at something much larger (“the sovereign 
conceit and ambition of.  .  . the individual, the ethnos, the demos, and the 
human race as a single entity” [4]), proceeds on the premise of the “intrinsic 
integrity, “spirit,” and “interdependence of all species and elements of the 
earth” (85). Recognizing this interdependence entails “cultivating an ethical 
view of other life species as having a fundamental right to exist as we do, and 
a much more fundamental right than the ‘right’ of any state to exist, given the 
artificial as opposed to organic nature of the state form” (138). Because the 
modern nation-state requires arbitrary borders, separates one people from 
another, and can be created and preserved only through coercion (physical or 
otherwise), it naturally must destroy these other life forms. To realize truly the 
freedom one seeks, one must abandon the modern conception of sovereignty 
and the instruments of exclusion and oppression (like capitalism) on which it 
rests. Quoting Taiaiake Alfred, Cocks invites us to embrace  a “responsibility 
to creation,” engage in “balanced co-existence among all human, animal, and 
spirit beings together with the earth,” and work to restore “harmony to the 
network of relationships.  .  . between human beings and all other creatures 
and natural elements of the universe” (79).
Krause, whose focus is the citizen, not the state, argues that agency 
within a domestic context ultimately depends on the conditions necessary for 
its “social uptake”; it is “an emergent property of intersubjective exchanges” 
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and not “solely a function of faculties such as the will that are strictly internal 
to the individual” (4). Individual freedom is therefore “a socially distrib-
uted phenomenon” (4), a factor, Krause argues, that privileged members of 
a society generally fail to recognize. By insisting on a “sovereigntist” view 
of agency, the beneficiaries of a system that perpetuates racism and sexism 
emphasize intentional choice and the control and efficacy of one’s actions, 
an emphasis which allows them to blame the oppressed for their inequal-
ity. Krause argues that this privileged perspective obstructs the realization of 
liberal individualism, namely “that every individual is entitled, within limits 
set by the equal entitlement of all, to live in this world in a way that manifests 
her distinctive individuality” (13). Freedom as nonoppression thus requires 
members of a liberal society to recognize “the distinctive individuality of 
each person” even though that individuality “is not reducible to the exercise 
of his personal choice” (148).  
Unfortunately, the arguments that Cocks and Krause advance for recov-
ering and strengthening the ties that bind us together both as citizens and 
as humans generally pay insufficient attention to the political preconditions 
required for the rejuvenation of such bonds. And in some cases, the posi-
tions they articulate would make these ties even more vulnerable. In their 
effort to free individuals from the oppression of states and society, they end 
up making people less free. Theirs is an antiliberal defense of liberalism. But 
before the reader can see these problems, he must first wade through abstract 
arguments and, at times, jargon-filled prose, as the following example from 
Cocks’s book attests:
poststructuralists asserted that the micro-operations of normalizing 
power in institutions and discursive practices dispersed throughout 
society produced individuals with desirable proclivities, habits, and 
traits that minimized the need for a centralized coercive power to 
keep subjects in line. In tandem or overlapping with technologies of 
“governmentality” in state and society through which whole popu-
lations were ordered for their own good and individuals remade as 
self-regulating, responsible private selves, normalizing power was 
declared to have replaced literal monarchical power and to have 
trumped the importance of the metaphorical monarch in the form of 
legal prohibitions against specific kinds of acts. (21–22) 
Or consider Krause’s description of what happens when one praises one’s 
five-year-old niece for her beauty. Instead of bestowing a compliment, one 
would actually “interpellate her as the object (i.e., imprison her within) 
the gaze of another, and.  .  . constitute her as subject to standards of male, 
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heterosexual desire” (101). Such excerpts are not the worst examples of style 
one could find. But given what passes for clear and persuasive writing in the 
social sciences today, one is dealing with a very low bar. Then again, this is 
perhaps to be expected from works that draw from the same Foucauldian 
well whose jargon has cluttered academic discourse for decades. The real dif-
ficulties, however, are not so much stylistic as they are conceptual. 
To confront these problems in Cocks’s work, one must ignore the partisan 
tone that suffuses her self-described “meditation” (2), with its anticonserva-
tive axe-grinding, occasional jeremiad against capitalism, and soft Marxism. 
One should also set aside the fact that she roots her argument against state 
sovereignty, a concept so venerable it is coeval with political thought itself, 
in just two examples drawn from modernity. Instead, one should note that 
the arguments she makes against state sovereignty undermine the “natural 
freedom” she hopes to realize, a concept crucial to her argument but which 
she tacks on at the end of the book, almost as an afterthought, and thus leaves 
undertheorized. Cocks wants to “de-link the rights of individuals” to make 
arrangements in common from “membership in a people with exclusive 
power in and control over a specific territory” (9–10). But such delinking 
necessarily entails the destruction of a common good, that is, a good to be 
shared in common by the members of that community. The European Union 
provides a perfect example of what happens to the rights of individuals when 
the community refuses to insist on the integrity of its political identity and 
the exclusive borders that preserve it in the name of a global humanitarian-
ism. Because they no longer take seriously the conditions required for the 
preservation of a particular political identity, an identity which insists on the 
equality of the sexes, the protection of children and minorities, and the pro-
motion of intellectual, material, and ecological progress, European political 
elites must necessarily include in their communities (because they have no 
basis on which they can exclude or reject them) those who do not support 
such notions and who, in an increasing number of cases, actively work to 
undermine them. 
Cocks can make these arguments because she indulges in the shallow 
moral relativism characteristic of contemporary progressivism: all ways of 
life are equal and entitled to protection except those that fail to profess its 
articles of faith. This allows her to emphasize Israeli mistreatment of Pal-
estinians without highlighting the crimes perpetrated against Israel by 
Palestinian terrorist groups or its so-called moderate government (chap. 3). It 
allows her to perpetuate the narrow view that Native American tribes never 
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knew war or scarcity prior to the arrival of the settlers (chap. 2). And it allows 
her to take as sacrosanct the “right of first possessor” without ever wondering 
how chance alone could imbue acquisition with an exclusive moral claim, a 
claim which, if true, would raise a host of difficulties for a Middle East that 
was once almost entirely Christian. 
Not surprisingly, Cocks’s brand of progressivism neglects the need to 
attend to the dynamics inherent in all common life. Thus she argues against 
the legitimacy of sovereign violence, conveniently forgetting that arms 
wielded by sovereign states also helped end injustices like slavery, genocide, 
and fascism. And she criticizes deliberation when it benefits the powerful, 
but not when it benefits the powerless. Thus the global conversation over 
the proper use and distribution of the world’s resources that Cocks envi-
sions must reserve a privileged space for the ecological perspective of a tiny 
minority regardless of the vast differences in power, numbers, and interests 
of the parties involved. There is more than a whiff of elitism here. Cocks even 
concludes her book by indulging the “tempting” fantasy of “a benevolent 
monarchy with absolute power to impose earth-friendly rules of behavior 
on the entire human race” (139). Contemporary nation-states have certainly 
given us plenty of reason to wonder whether the freedom and prosperity they 
make possible are worth the inequality and violence that attend the creation 
of such goods. But Cocks abdicates from the beginning the sobering insight 
that the sovereignty which makes possible war and exclusion is also required 
for the preservation of those all too rare (and hence precious) partnerships 
dedicated to human freedom. 
Despite the obvious humanity, intelligence, and thoughtfulness in Free-
dom Beyond Sovereignty, a similar utopianism hinders Sharon Krause’s book. 
She opens by declaring that the “United States promises freedom and justice 
to all, and as American citizens we have a collective obligation to fulfill this 
promise” (1). But this phrase, “freedom and justice for all,” which appears 
more than twenty times in her book, does not appear in any of the founding 
political documents of the United States of America. Nor have our great-
est statesmen, well aware of the limits of what can be achieved in political 
life, ever understood this to be a “promise” that obliges its government and 
citizenry to uphold in all cases. As Abraham Lincoln argued in his speech 
“The Meaning of the Declaration of Independence,” the rights laid out in this 
venerable document constitute an aspirational standard, one to be pursued 
as prudence dictates and not as principle commands, and in full knowledge 
that we will always fall short of its lofty goals.  Of course, even if one could 
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understand the United States to offer freedom and justice to all, Krause goes 
to great lengths in her book to distinguish freedom from agency and to argue 
that one can be free without being fully agentic; the realization of individual 
agency is the work of society rather than of the government. It is perhaps no 
accident then that Krause notes in her third chapter that the achievement of 
“freedom and justice for all” requires us to imagine and construct a “funda-
mentally new social order. . . one that does away with domination altogether” 
(101). To her credit, Krause strikes a more modest tone in her penultimate 
chapter (chap. 5), noting that securing freedom in one area risks sacrificing 
freedoms in other areas. But it would be helpful if such modesty tempered the 
insistence on securing “freedom and justice for all” that one finds elsewhere 
in her book.   
In advancing a social agenda that will remedy the unjust and systematic 
inequalities plaguing American life, Krause is clearly hunting big game. And 
her optimism in thinking such game can be caught operates on an equally 
large assumption, namely, that there is no gap between truth and life, between 
political wisdom and political practice. To create a society in which “others 
understand your actions in ways that are consonant with your understand-
ing of it. . . [and] respond to the action in ways that sustain its meaning and 
impact” (37) requires citizens to recognize and appreciate the infinite variety 
of ways in which their fellow citizens will understand themselves. This not 
only depends on a citizenry with remarkable powers of discernment (and 
a “Socrates” will always be misunderstood by the unwise), but also requires 
that one’s fellow citizens share the same posture towards the differences of 
others, a posture that goes well beyond tolerating others to include respect-
ing, cherishing, and valuing them. Krause seeks to protect the agency of the 
marginalized by extending the scope of responsibility well past its logical 
limits.  
The kind of social uniformity advocated by Krause here was described by 
the greatest student of American democracy as “tyranny of the majority,” a 
condition no less lethal to freedom and agency than the inequalities Krause 
deplores. Tocqueville understood that one could not simply deny someone 
the “social uptake” (to use Krause’s words) to act on his words and beliefs 
without negatively affecting his freedom to say and think what he wants. And 
it is disingenuous to say that someone, like the white supremacist in Krause’s 
example, enjoys freedom of speech when you tell him in advance that no one 
will actually listen to him. This is at odds with the kind of society that Krause 
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hopes will remain genuinely open to the diversity provided by vibrant cul-
tural perspectives and authentically different individuals. 
In fairness to our author, all good liberals on both the right and the 
left will naturally denounce the injustice of racial hierarchies and so some 
restrictions on agency must be acknowledged. But the criteria for restrictions 
on agency (“prevent harm to others and. . . be consistent with the equal exer-
cise of freedom for all” [153]) will prove particularly elusive in a society where 
the failure to affirm the subjective identities of others is considered harmful 
because it contributes to systematic injustices. Whether she intends it or not, 
Krause’s work supports the environment, ever more fashionable on college 
campuses, in which the concern with microaggressions and the need for safe 
spaces erode the freedom of others to speak and act as they think best within 
the confines of the law. For if liberal individualism can require members of 
society to respect the claim of a man to identify as a woman, or a transgen-
dered individual to live authentically as a “they,” then doesn’t it also deny to 
others the use of their natural reason to distinguish between the sexes or to 
insist on the difference between singular and plural? Indeed, it seems fair to 
wonder what happens to political freedom and democratic citizenship when 
the public use of reason gets subordinated to imagination and counterpublic 
conversation, tools Krause calls upon to serve the transformational goals of 
the marginalized (chap. 3). Isn’t such liberation from sovereignty really a lib-
eration from reason? And can that really provide freedom and justice for all? 
